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Abstract
Much of the increase in female labor force participation in the post-war period has come
from the entry of married women with young children. Accompanying this change has been a
rise in cultural acceptance of maternal employment. We argue that the concurrent S-shaped rise
in maternal participation and its cultural acceptance is well explained by generations of women
engaged in Bayesian learning about the effects of maternal employment on children. Each
generation updates their parents’ beliefs by observing the children of employed women. When
few women participate in the labor force, most observations are uninformative and participation
rises slowly. As information accumulates and the effects of labor force participation become
less uncertain, more women participate, learning accelerates and labor force participation rises
faster. As beliefs converge to the truth, participation flattens out. Survey data, wage data and
participation data support our mechanism and distinguish it from alternative explanations.
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One of the most dramatic economic changes of the last century has been the rise in female
labor force participation. Central to this rise has been the entry of married women with young
children. While only 6% of the mothers of preschool age children worked in the labor market in
1940, 60% of these mothers are employed today. This phenomenon took place at the same time as
a radical cultural change in the social acceptability of maternal employment. In just the last three
decades, the fraction of people who report that a preschool child is likely to suffer if her mother
works, has fallen by almost one-half. A large empirical literature has argued that such attitudes
and beliefs, broadly defined as culture, are an important determinant of labor force participation.1
We investigate where these cultural beliefs come from and how they interact with the labor force
participation decisions of women with young children.
We argue that beliefs are formed and evolve over time as women learn about the relative im-
portance of nature (innate ability) and nurture (the role of maternal employment) in determining
children’s outcomes. A crucial factor in a woman’s choice to work is the effect of her employment
on her children. The extent to which labor force participation trades off with children’s future
utility is unknown. Women pass down beliefs about the importance of nurture to their children.
Each generation updates those beliefs, using a set of observations on other children’s outcomes.
However, observations are only informative about the cost of labor force participation if women
in the previous generation work. Initially, very few women participate in the labor market; infor-
mation about the role of nurture diffuses slowly and beliefs are nearly constant. As information
accumulates and the effects of labor force participation become less uncertain, more women par-
ticipate, learning accelerates and labor force participation rises more quickly. As beliefs converge
to the truth, learning slows down and participation flattens out. This interaction between beliefs
and participation generates a simultaneous S-shaped evolution of women’s beliefs and of labor force
participation that mimics the data from the past century.
Why explore a learning explanation when existing theories based on technological innovation,
falling child care costs, the less physical nature of jobs and increases in women’s wages have had
1See Ferna´ndez and Fogli (2005), Ferna´ndez, Fogli, and Olivetti (2002), Fortin (2005), Alesina and Giuliano (2007).
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success in explaining features of participation?2 First, cultural change itself is economically im-
portant (Giuliano (2007), Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004) and Barro and McCleary (2006)).
While Bisin and Verdier (2000) and Doepke and Zilibotti (2007) have modeled culture as a feature
of preferences, we develop a model of cultural change based on Bayesian learning. Second, the ex-
isting theories rely on some, often unstated, assumptions about what agents know and believe. For
example, a model where a new technology enables a woman to complete housework and pursue a
career typically assumes that the woman is aware of the technology, knows its effect on her produc-
tivity, and understands the effect on her children of outsourcing their care. This model examines
those kinds of informational assumptions. Third, adding learning allows the model to reconcile a
broad set of facts about participation dynamics, cross-sectional differences in female participation,
labor supply elasticity and reported beliefs, that other theories to not.
As a theoretical contribution, the model fills a gap between the literature on S-shaped learn-
ing dynamics and that on endogenous information. The S-shaped learning dynamic is similar to
Amador and Weill’s (2006) model where agents, arranged on a lattice, learn what their neighbors
know. But rather than studying the spread of information that agents are endowed with, we study
an environment where information is revealed only if a woman works. The fact that informa-
tion and actions are mutually interdependent delivers additional testable predictions. Not only do
beliefs predict actions, as in exogenous information models, but actions also predict changes in be-
liefs. This idea that information is a by-product of economic activity appears in Van Nieuwerburgh
and Veldkamp (2006). But there was no S-shaped learning dynamic. Because the variable being
learned about was constantly changing, beliefs did not converge. Combining these two sets of ideas
generates new predictions that are supported by data.
Over the last century, female labor force participation and beliefs about the welfare of children
with working mothers have risen concurrently, following an S-shaped time path. Section 1 estab-
lishes this fact and presents evidence on the two key ingredients of our story: The change in the
labor supply of married women with small children has been a major factor in the rise of aggre-
2See Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu (2001), Goldin and Katz (2002), and Albanesi and Olivetti (2006) on
technologies, Attanasio, Low, and Sanchez-Marcos (2006) on child care costs, and Goldin (1990), Jones, Manuelli,
and McGrattan (2003) on nature of jobs.
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gate female labor force; and there is great uncertainty about the effect of maternal employment on
children.
Section 2 develops an overlapping generation model where a woman faces a trade-off between
enjoying more consumption if she enters the labor force and earns a wage, and staying out of
the labor force to nurture her children and ensure they have high future utility. Women use
Bayesian updating to learn about the importance of maternal employment in determining children’s
outcomes. The results (section 3) show how two competing forces speed up, then slow down learning,
creating the S-shaped participation dynamic. Learning is slow at first because few women work,
making data about labor force participation scarce. As women learn, participation increases and
speeds up learning. The offsetting force is that as beliefs become more informed, new information
affects them less. We also show that, as learning converges, labor force participation becomes less
responsive to wages, a feature of recent data (Blau and Kahn 2005).
To evaluate the quantitative predictions of the model, sections 4 and 5 use moments of the labor
force participation data and the distribution of wages from the census to calibrate and simulate a
dynamic learning model. We compare participation rates, survey responses, wages and endowments
predicted by the model to the data. The simulated time path of labor force participation looks
strikingly similar to the data, slightly over-predicting the increase. When we ask agents in our
model the questions from our survey data, their replies match the level and evolution of the actual
survey responses. Finally, wages and endowments of working women change over time in the model
because of a selection effect: The women who choose to work is changing. For endowments, the
model under-predicts their level but matches the size of their increase. For wages, the model
matches the data well until 1980. At that point, wages rise suddenly, in the data, but not in the
model. We show that adding a high-intensity occupation that has a higher and more uncertain toll
on children, but offers higher wages, can match the increase in women’s wage.
Section 6 evaluates other testable implications of our learning model for belief dispersion, wage
elasticity, history dependence of participation decisions, and the change in survey responses over
the life-cycle. In section 7, we use these predictions to distinguish our learning theory from other
competing explanations. Section 8 concludes.
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1 Motivating Facts: Beliefs, Participation and Child Development
Before proceeding with our theory, we document the rise in labor force participation and the cultural
change we are building the theory to explain. We also establish support for a critical assumption
of our model, that the effects of maternal employment on children is uncertain.
1.1 Employment increase of women with young children
The bulk of the increase in labor force participation came from married women with children.
Single mothers and women without children started with much higher participation rates, which
increased, but not dramatically. In contrast, the participation of married women with children
increased by more than three-fold. Even among this subgroup, the largest increase came from
women with children under 5 years of age. The participation rate for this group was 6% in 1940
and rose almost 10-fold to 59% in 2004. For this reason, we focus our theory on the concerns and
trade-offs that women with children face. The rest of our data analysis will pertain to the group
of women whose labor force participation showed the most change over the last century: married
women, with children under 5 years of age.
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Figure 1: Labor force participation among sub-groups of women.
Details of the data are in appendix B.
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1.2 Change in beliefs
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Figure 2: Labor force participation and average survey responses.
Survey questions are about the effect of women’s labor force participation on children. Appendix B states each
question. A higher level indicates a more favorable attitude toward participation.
One of the reasons to think that the main force is changes in beliefs about the effect of mar-
ket work on children is survey evidence revealing that such beliefs have changed. The survey
questions are about whether a married woman should work (fework), whether she compromises
her relationship with her children (fechld), whether pre-school age children, in particular, suffer
(preschool), and whether her family suffers (fefam). (Data details in appendix B.) Figure 2 plots
labor force participation and survey answers, from 1930-2005. The fact that the survey responses
are increasing in their average level indicates that, over time, people believe that women’s labor
force participation is less harmful to their families. What is striking about this graph is that the
labor force participation tracks the survey responses so closely and that both display an S shape.
Greater participation and cultural change are highly correlated.
Data from surveys that ask specifically about employment in various stages of women’s lifecycle
show that the presence of a small child is crucial in determining attitudes. Since we have these
data only in 1988, 1994 and 2002, we pool the three years. When asked if a woman should work
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full time outside the home after marrying and before there are children, 70% say yes. But when
that woman has an infant, support falls to 10%. (See appendix B for data details.) Whatever is
determining beliefs about the costs and benefits of labor force participation is not something that
affects all women equally. It hinges crucially on the presence of children.
1.3 Psychological evidence on the true value of nurture
Our theory is based on the premise that the effect of mothers’ employment on children is uncertain.
This is a reasonable assumption because even academic psychologists have not reached a consensus.
Harvey (1999) summarizes studies that started in the early 60s and flourished in the 1980s when the
children of the women interviewed in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) reached
adulthood. Six different published studies have used the NLSY to examine the longitudinal effects
of early maternal employment on children’s development, controlling for various family background
variables. Harvey compares these studies and concludes that “their results have been surprisingly
mixed.” Her analysis of the data indicates that working more hours is associated with slightly lower
cognitive development through age 9 and slightly lower academic achievement scores before age 7.
A more recent study by Hill, Waldfogel, Brooks-Gunn, and Han (2005) finds small but significant
negative effects of maternal employment on children’s cognitive outcomes for full-time employment
in the first year post-birth as compared with employment postponed until after the 1st year. Bernal
and Keane (2006) concur: Having a full-time working mother who uses informal child care during
one of the first five years after childbirth is associated with a 3.4 percent reduction in the child’s
test score. Belsky (1988) also finds that maternal employment is detrimental: Infants who were
in non maternal care for more than 20 hours per week were at elevated risk for being insecurely
attached at age 1 and were more aggressive and disobedient between ages 3 and 8. In sum, while
there is little evidence of negative effects of maternal employment when children are older, there is
substantial debate about the size of the effects of maternal employment in early childhood.
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2 The Model
We assume a discrete infinite horizon, t = 1, 2, ..., and we consider an overlapping generation
economy made up of a large finite number of agents living for two periods. Each agent is nurtured
in the first period and consumes and has one child in the second period of her life. Preferences of
an individual in family i born at time t−1 depend on their consumption cit and the potential wage
of their child wi,t+1.
U =
c1−γit
1− γ + β
w1−γi,t+1
1− γ γ > 1 (1)
This utility function captures the idea that parents care about their child’s potential, but not the
choices they make. This shuts down an experimentation motive where mothers participate in order
to create information that their decedents can observe. Such a motive makes the problem both
intractable and unrealistic. Responsible parents do not gamble with their children’s future just to
observe what happens.
The budget constraint of the individual from family i born at time t− 1 is
cit = nitwit + ωit (2)
where ωit is an endowment which could represent a spouse’s income and nit ∈ {0, 1} is the discrete
labor force participation choice. If the agent works in the labor force, nit = 1.
The key feature of the model is that an individual’s earning potential is determined by a
combination of endowed ability and nurturing, that cannot be perfectly disentangled. Endowed
ability is an unobserved normal random variable ai,t ∼ N(µa, σ2a). If a mother stays home with her
child, the child’s full natural ability is achieved. If the mother joins the labor force, some unknown
amount θ of the child’s ability will be lost. Wages depend exponentially on ability:
wi,t = exp(ai,t − ni,t−1θ) (3)
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Information Sets The constant θ determines the importance of nurture and is not known when
making labor supply decisions. Young agents inherit their prior beliefs about θ from their parents’
beliefs. In the first generation, initial beliefs are θi,0 ∼ N(µ0, σ20). Each subsequent generation
updates these beliefs by observing w’s. But, their signals are only informative about the effect
of maternal employment on wages if a mother actually worked. Note from equation (3) that if
ni,t−1 = 0, then wi,t is only reflecting innate ability and contains no information about θ.
Each agent knows whether she was nurtured ni,t−1 and observes her potential wage wi,t at the
beginning of time t. We refer to w as the potential wage because it is observed, regardless of
whether the agent chooses to work.3 In addition, she observes both potential earnings and parental
employment decisions for J peers, randomly and independently chosen from the population. Ability
a is never observed so that θ can never be perfectly inferred from the wage. The set of family indices
for the outcomes observed by agent i is Ji. Agents use the information in observed potential wages
to update their prior, according to Bayes’ law.
Bayesian updating with J signals is equivalent to running a regression of children’s potential
wages on parents’ labor choices and then forming a linear combination of the estimated weight on
labor choices θˆ and the prior belief µt. Figure 3 shows the timing of information revelation and
decision-making.
Period t−1
Agent (i,t) born
inherits beliefs µi,t−1
Period t
See potential wage wi,t
See J−1 other wj,t
Update: form µi,t
Choose ni,t
Period t+1
Consume ci,t
See child outcome wi,t+1
Figure 3: Model timing.
3This assumption could be relaxed. If wi,t were only observed once agent (i,t) decided to work, then an informative
signal about θ would only be observed if both ni,t = 1 and ni,t−1 = 1. Since this condition is satisfied less frequently,
such a model would make fewer signals observed and make learning slower.
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At the end of each period t, the regression agents run to form their signal is
W − µa = Nθ + εi
where W and N are J × 1 vectors {logwj,t}j²Ji and {ni,t−1}j²Ji . Let n¯i,t be the sum of the labor
decisions for the set of families that (i, t) observes: n¯i,t =
∑
j²Ji ni,t. The resulting estimated
coefficient θˆ is normally distributed with mean µˆi,t =
∑
j²Ji(logwj,t − µa)nj,t/n¯i,t and variance
σˆ2i,t = σ
2
a/n¯i,t.
Posterior beliefs about the value of nurturing are normally distributed θ ∼ N(µi,t, σ2i,t). The
posterior mean is a linear combination of the estimated coefficient and the prior beliefs, where each
component’s weight is its relative precision:
µi,t =
σˆ2i,t
σ2i,t−1 + σˆ
2
i,t
µi,t−1 +
σ2i,t−1
σ2i,t + σˆ
2
i,t
µˆi,t (4)
The posterior precision (inverse of the variance) is the sum of the prior precision and the signal
precision. Thus posterior variance is
σ2i,t = (σ
−2
i,t−1 + σˆ
−2
i,t )
−1. (5)
Definition of equilibrium An equilibrium is a sequence of wages, distributions that characterize
beliefs about θ, work and consumption choices, for each individual i in each generation t such that:
1. Taking beliefs and wages as given, consumption and labor decisions maximize expected utility
(1) subject to the budget constraint (2).
2. Wages of agents born in period t − 1 are consistent with the labor choice of the parents, as
in (3).
3. An agent i born at date t− 1 chooses consumption and labor at date t. That optimization is
conditioned on beliefs µi,t, σi,t.
4. Priors µi,t−1, σi,t−1 are equal to the posterior beliefs of the parent, born at t − 1. Priors are
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updated using observed wage outcomes Ji,t, according to Bayes’ law (4).
5. Distributions of elements Ji,t are consistent with distribution of optimal labor choices ni,(t−1).
3 Results
Substituting the budget constraint (2) and the law of motion for wages (3) into expected utility
(1) produces the following optimization problem for agent i born at date t− 1:
max
nit ² {0,1}
(nitwit + ωit)1−γ
1− γ + βEai,t+1,θ
[
exp ((ai,t+1 − ni,tθ)(1− γ))
1− γ
]
. (6)
Taking the expectation over the unknown ability a and the importance of nurture θ delivers expected
utilities from each choice. If a woman stays out of the labor force, her expected utility is
EUOit =
(ωit)1−γ
1− γ +
β
1− γ exp
(
µa(1− γ) + 12σ
2
a(1− γ)2
)
. (7)
If she participates in the labor force, her expected utility is
EUWit =
(wit + ωit)1−γ
1− γ +
β
1− γ exp
(
(µa − µi,t)(1− γ) + 12(σ
2
a + σ
2
i,t)(1− γ)2
)
. (8)
The optimal policy is to join the labor force when the expected utility from employment is greater
than the expected utility from staying home (EUWit > EUOit). Define Nit ≡ EUWit −EUOit to
be the expected net benefit of labor force participation, conditional on time t information (µi,t, σi,t).
3.1 The Role of Beliefs in Labor Force Participation
We begin by establishing some intuitive properties of the labor force participation decision rule.
Women who think nurture is more important and those who are more uncertain about the impor-
tance of nurture are less likely to work.
Proposition 1 A higher expected value of nurture reduces the probability that a woman will par-
ticipate in the labor force, holding all else equal.
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Proof: in appendix A.1. The logic of this result can be seen in equation (8). Increasing the expected
value of nurture decreases the net expected utility of labor force participation: ∂Ni,t/∂µi,t = −β,
times an term which is an exponential and thus must be non-negative. Since −β < 0, a higher µi,t
reduces the utility gain from labor force participation and therefore reduces the probability that a
woman will participate.
Proposition 2 Greater uncertainty about the value of nurture reduces the probability that a woman
will participate in the labor force, holding all else equal.
Proof: in appendix A.2. Again, the logic of the result is in the fact that the benefit to working
is falling in uncertainty: ∂Ni,t/∂σi,t = (1 − γ)β, times an term which is an exponential and thus
must be non-negative. Since γ > 1, then (1− γ)β < 0, meaning that more uncertainty reduces the
probability a woman will participate.
3.2 S-shaped Learning Dynamics
The model generates an S-shaped pattern of labor force participation because beliefs about the cost
of participation move slowly at first, then faster, and then slow down. There are two competing
forces that generate this dynamic. One force is that as the number of women in the labor force
increases, the average sized revision in beliefs increases. The second, competing force is that as
beliefs converge to the truth, revisions in beliefs become smaller.
The information gleaned from observing others’ labor market outcomes can be described as
a signal with mean µˆi,t =
∑
j²Ji(logwj,t − µa)nj,t/n¯i,t and variance σˆ2i,t = σ2a/n¯i,t. Let ρ be the
fraction of women who participate in the labor force. Then, the expected precision of this signal is
E[σˆ−2i,t ] = ρNσ
2
a.
A higher signal precision increases the expected size of squared changes in beliefs. This condi-
tional variance of t beliefs, conditional on period t−1 beliefs is the difference between prior variance
and posterior variance: var(µi,t|µi,t−1) = σ2i,t−1 − σ2i,t. Substituting in for posterior variance (5),
var(µi,t|µi,t−1) = σ2i,t−1 −
1
σ−2i,t−1 + σˆ
−2
i,t
. (9)
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Since ∂var(µi,t|µi,t−1)/∂σˆ−2i,t > 0, the expected size of revisions is increasing in the precision of the
observed signals. For the average agent, this precision is increasing in the fraction of women who
work. This is the first force as work that increases the rate of learning over time and causes the
labor force participation rate to increase at an increasing rate, early in the century.
The second force is the convergence or beliefs to the truth. Over time, the variance of beliefs
about θ declines. This effect can be seen in the posterior variance formula (5). If there is no
information in any of the observed labor market outcomes, then σ2i,t = σ
2
i,t−1. Given any new
information, σˆ−2i,t > 0, posterior variance is lower than in the previous period: σ
2
i,t < σ
2
i,t−1. As σ
2
falls, the conditional variance of changes in beliefs falls as well: ∂var/∂σ2i,t−1 > 0.
The increase in signal quality early on in the century was the dominant force, causing learn-
ing to speed up. This effect diminished later on because the convergence of beliefs to the truth
reduces the effect of higher signal precision. This effect is about the cross-partial derivative:
∂2var/∂σˆ−2i,t ∂σ
−2
i,t−1 = −2/(σ−2i,t−1 + σˆ−2i,t )3 < 0. The convergence of beliefs is the dominant force,
slowing down learning later in the century both because higher prior precision makes belief revisions
smaller and because higher prior precision reduces the effect of more informative signals.
What starts the transition? The discussion of labor force participation dynamics raises the
question of how this dynamic transition started and why it started in the early 20th century. The
shift from agriculture to industrialization at the end of the 19th century changed the nature of
work. In agriculture, women allocated time continuously between work and child-rearing. This
was possible because home and work were in the same location. Industrialization required women
who took jobs to outsource their child care. Only at that stage did people start to ask what effects
outsourcing has on children.
If no women initially participated in industrial era employment and therefore no information was
being generated about the effects of maternal employment, one might worry that such a situation
might be an absorbing state. The following proposition (proven in appendix A.3) shows that zero
labor force participation is not a steady state.
Proposition 3 In any period where the labor force participation rate is zero (
∑
j nj,t−1 = 0), there
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is a positive probability that at least one woman will work in the following period (
∑
j nj,t ≥ 1).
Zero participation is a state that can persist for many periods and is exited each period with a
small probability. All it takes to escape a zero-participation state is for one extremely able woman
to be born. For a sufficiently able woman, working will be optimal, despite the uncertainty and
pessimism about the effect of working on her children.
Condition (8) also suggests circumstances in which such a woman is likely to emerge. When
the endowment ωjt is low, the cutoff ability level a∗ will be lower because the marginal value of
women’s income is higher. Thus, in times like the great depression or wars when husbands’ incomes
are lost, or when technologies reduce the cost of participation, the probability that a woman would
be sufficiently able to work rises. Thus, existing theories can provide a shock that sparks the
transition. But such exogenous shocks are not necessary for the transition to occur.
3.3 Additional Testable Predictions
To determine whether learning is playing a role in female labor force participation, we need to
derive indirect predictions of the model. Later, we use these predictions to empirically distinguish
learning from other potential explanations.
3.3.1 The Effect of Wealth
An alternative explanation for the flattening out of women’s labor force participation is that women
participate less when their wealth level is higher. This force is present in the model.
Proposition 4 Greater initial wealth ωi,t reduces the probability that a woman will participate in
the labor force, holding all else equal.
Proof in appendix A.4. The effect of wealth on the value of participating in the labor force is
∂Ni,t/∂ωi,t = (wi,t + ωi,t)−γ − (ωi,t)−γ . This is negative because (wi,t + ωi,t) > (ωi,t) holds with
probability one. This means that more wealth reduces the utility gain from labor force participation.
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3.3.2 Learning and Labor Supply Elasticity
The wage elasticity of the labor supply is the marginal change in the log probability that a woman
participates due to a log change in the average wage. Since wages make working more attractive,
this elasticity is always positive. However, it declines as women learn more about the effects of
labor force participation on their children. (Proof in appendix A.5.)
Proposition 5 As uncertainty about the value of nurture falls, the wage elasticity of an individual’s
labor force participation declines: ∂2 ln(Prob(Ni,t > 0))/∂σ2i,t∂ ln(mean(wi,t)) > 0, ∀(i, t).
Changing the average wage has two effects, each of which interacts with uncertainty. There is a
direct effect on the benefit of working and an indirect effect on the expected wage of children. The
direct effect of a decrease in uncertainty is to reduce the cutoff wage required to induce a woman
to work. The elasticity of labor supply is equal to the hazard function of the wage distribution,
evaluated at the cutoff wage. Therefore, a reduction in the cutoff value means a lower value for
the hazard function and a lower elasticity. More intuitively, when uncertainty is low, more women
are already in the labor force and have wages far above the cutoff wage. The density of women
with wages near the cutoff wage is small. Therefore, proportional changes in the wage have a small
effect on the number of women who work, when uncertainty is low.
The indirect effect is that an increase in the average wage makes mothers expect a higher
income for their children as well. Higher income diminishes the marginal utility cost of reducing
the child’s future income by working (utility is concave). This lowers the cutoff wage, making
more women participate. Uncertainty amplifies the effect of a higher average child’s wage on this
cutoff. Our utility function is such that agents are more averse to risk when wage realizations
are low than when they are high. Therefore, they are much more responsive to a changes in the
probability of catastrophic outcomes than to average or excellent ones. When uncertainty increases,
the probability of extreme outcomes rises. When more probability is placed on the catastrophic
outcomes, agents become more sensitive to changes in the average wage. The higher probability
of excellent outcomes reduces their sensitivity, but by less. Therefore, when uncertainty increases,
this net increased sensitivity to changes in the average wage causes the elasticity of labor supply
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to rise. Since both the direct and the indirect effect cause elasticity to increase with uncertainty,
as learning resolves uncertainty over time, the labor supply elasticity falls.
3.3.3 Survey responses in the model
One of the dimensions along which we will evaluate our model is to compare its predictions for
beliefs about the value of labor force participation to survey data about whether mothers should
participate in the labor force. To do this, we need a precise mapping between the survey responses
and model quantities. We establish this mapping by asking agents in our model whether they
believe, based on their observed information, that the average household’s utility U would be
higher if the mother worked. Agent j with beliefs µj,t, σj,t answers no if
(
∑
k∈Jj wk/J + exp(µω))
1−γ
1− γ +
β
1− γ exp
(
(µa − µj,t)(1− γ) + 12(σ
2
a + σ
2
j,t)(1− γ)2
)
>
exp(µω(1− γ))
1− γ +
β
1− γ exp
(
µa(1− γ) + 12σ
2
a(1− γ)2
)
. (10)
We use the mean of all the wage realizations observed by agent j at time t (
∑
k∈Jj wk/J) to
estimated agent j’s belief about the average wage among women in the population.4
4 Calibration
We need to choose parameters for earnings of husbands and wives, utility of leisure, initial beliefs
about the value of nurture, a true value of nurture and a number of outcomes to observe each
period. These parameters are summarized in table 1. Appendix C provides more detail on the
estimation of the calibration targets.
4This is an approximation to keep the expression simple. It is not the optimal belief because agent j could also
use prior information in forming this belief. But, this problem become intractable because forming a belief about
the average wage requires forming a belief about the fraction of women who were nurtured. This requires beliefs
about the labor force participation decisions of these women’s mothers. Since the mothers’ decisions depend on the
mothers’ beliefs, this requires agent j to form beliefs over the entire past history of signals observed by each family.
15
mean log ability µa -0.88 women’s earnings distribution
std log ability σa 0.57 women’s earnings distribution
mean log endowment µω -0.28 average endowment = 1
std log endowment σω 0.75 men’s earnings distribution
outcomes observed J 3 Prob(ni,t = ni,t−1)1970− 2000
prior mean θ µ0 0.04 unbiased beliefs
prior std θ σ0 1.38 1940 LFP
true value of nurture θ 0.04 children’s test scores (NLSY)
intertemporal substitution γ 2 commonly used
Table 1: Parameter values for the simulated model and the calibration targets.
Our strategy is to choose parameters of the earnings and endowment distributions in our model
to match the empirical earnings distributions of married women with children under age 5 and
their husbands. We match the moments for 1940, the earliest year for which we have the wage
distribution data. Since we interpret women’s endowment ω as being the earnings of their husbands,
we use a log-normal distribution, ln(ω) ∼ N(µω, σ2ω), which is frequently used to describe earnings.
We normalize the average endowment (not in logs) to 1 and use σω to match the dispersion of
1940 annual wage income of husbands with children under 5 at home. For women, the mean and
standard deviation of ability, µa and σa, match the earnings gap between working women and their
husbands and its log standard deviation to data in 1940.
For information-related variables, we don’t have such direct observable counterparts. Therefore,
we need to infer these variables from properties of the observable participation data. Initial beliefs
are assumed to be the same for all women and unbiased, implying µ0 = θ. Uncertainty σ0 is chosen
to match women’s 1940 labor force participation. The number of signals observed each period J
matches the 42% average probability of a woman making a different labor participation decision
than her mother. We use the 1970-2000 GSS data because matched mother-daughter data is only
available for those years. The rationale for matching this moment is that a woman who gets no
signals will have the same beliefs as her mother and is likely to choose the same action. A woman
who observes many signals will have posterior beliefs potentially far away from the priors she
inherited from her mother and will have a higher chance of switching outcomes. A seminar paper
in the sociology literature (Marsden 1987) estimates that the average American has three other
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people with whom he/she discusses important issues. Since J includes the woman’s observation of
her own wage, this implies J = 4. Section D explores alternative calibrations. Setting J = 4 does
not appreciably worsen the fit of the model. Introducing biased initial beliefs allows agents to be
much less uncertain initially and has a mild slowing effect on learning.5
The true value of nurture θ comes from evidence on the effect of maternal employment on
Peabody Individual Achievement Test scores of children (Bernal and Keane 2006) and the corre-
lation between the childhood test scores, educational attainment, and future earnings, estimated
by Goldin and Katz (1999). One year of full time maternal employment plus informal day care
reduces test scores by roughly 3.4%. Maternal employment from ages one through six translates
into a 4% drop in children’s future annual wages.
The model also needs an initial distribution of signals, which are observations of wages and
parental working decisions, in period 1 (1940). Our calibration determines the initial wages, but
not the maternal employment decisions. Those come from labor decisions in the previous period
(1930). To generate these, we simulate a 1930 period where we fix the labor supply equal to 3
percent, consistent with 1930 Census data and generate a set of signals from those outcomes.
5 Simulation Results
We simulate a model with 2000 agents for 10 periods. Agents are born at age 15 with beliefs
inherited from their parents. At the end of the first 10-year period outcomes are observed and
agents update their beliefs. We assume that each individual observes the potential wage and the
employment history of 2 other individuals of the same generation, that are randomly drawn from
the distribution. Given the updated beliefs, at age 25 they enter adulthood, have a child and decide
whether to participate in the labor market or not.
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Figure 4: Labor force participation and survey responses in the model and data.
LFP is the probability a woman participates in the labor force. The rise in survey responses means that women
believe labor force participation is less harmful to their children’s future outcomes over time.
5.1 S-shaped dynamics of participation and beliefs
Figure 4 illustrates the two main predictions of the model. The first (left panel) is the S-shaped
rise in labor force participation in the simulated model. If we interpret 1 period as 10 years, then
our model matches the realized labor force participation rates reasonably well. Using the model
to project forward in time, it forecasts that there will be a 52% participation rate in 2005, after
which the rate will change very little because learning has mostly converged. In the data, the
2005 participation rate was 59%, meaning that our model under-predicts the increase in labor force
participation. At the same time, this leaves some room for factors such as increases in wages and
innovations in household technologies to have some effect as well.
The second prediction of the model is that agents’ estimates of the value of nurture fall in an
S-shaped pattern. Figure 4 (right panel) plots the simulated and actual survey responses taken
from (10) for the simulations and from answers to the Census’ preschool question for the data.
We use the preschool question because it asks specifically about the effect of maternal employment
on preschool-age children. The mothers of children below five years of age are the ones whose
participation decisions are in the left panel. The drawback of this particular question is that it
5See Amador and Weill (2006) for an explanation of why more precise initial information slows information
diffusion.
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misses data before 1977. The calibration appendix describes how we the fework question to infer
the earlier data. The result is that the fraction of respondents who support maternal employment
and the evolution in that fraction are well-explained by the model.
Taken together, these two graphs illustrate the model’s main mechanism: When labor force
participation is low, information about the cost of maternal employment on children is scarce, and
beliefs change slowly. The slow change in beliefs means a slow rise in the participation rate. As
that rate rises, more information is generated by working women whose children’s outcomes are
observed. Beliefs and participation change at a faster rate. Once information becomes sufficiently
abundant, beliefs and labor force participation converge, in unison, to their new steady-state values.
5.2 Decline in uncertainty
One of the predictions that distinguishes the learning model from other explanations is that learning
entails a reduction in uncertainty. A common proxy for uncertainty is the dispersion in beliefs. The
idea is that when there is lots of uncertainty, there is also lots of disagreement about what the right
answer is.
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Figure 5: Uncertainty and belief dispersion in the simulated model.
Belief dispersion is the cross-sectional standard deviation of the beliefs: std(µi,t). Uncertainty is the average posterior
standard deviation: mean(σi,t).
In the model, uncertainty declines monotonically (figure 5, right panel), but belief dispersion,
a measure of disagreement, increases then decreases (left panel). Belief dispersion starts out low
because we assume that agents have common prior beliefs. Common beliefs, by definition, means
19
no dispersion. As women begin working, some agents observe labor market outcomes, while oth-
ers do not. Furthermore, the inferences that agents make from observing different labor market
outcomes vary because the unobserved innate ability of the workers they observe is different. As
new information arrives, beliefs diverge. Recall that what slows learning down at the end of the
S-curve is that beliefs converge to the truth. Since the true importance of nurture is the same for
all agents, their beliefs converge to each other and dispersion falls. The testable prediction here
is that, in periods where the increase in labor force participation is slowing down, differences in
beliefs should be shrinking. We test this prediction in the next section.
5.3 Wages and wealth of working women
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Figure 6: Average relative wage and endowed wealth for working women.
Relative wage is the woman’s wage divided by her husband’s wage (wit/ωit). Mean relative wage is the relative wage
averaged over all employed women. Mean endowment is the average wage for the husband of an employed woman.
Figure 6 shows the mean endowment and the mean wage of the subset of women who choose to
participate in the simulated model. We assumed that the unconditional distribution of endowments
and abilities is constant. What is changing is the nurture inputs and the selection of women who
work. In other words, this is primarily a selection effect.
The finding that women’s relative wages declined in the early part of the sample is surprising.
But this finding is supported by O’Neill (1984) who documents a widening of the male-female
wage gap in the mid-50’s to 70’s. She attributes it to the same selection effect that operates in
our model. What the model does not explain is why women’s wages rise, relative to men’s after
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1970. Appendix E works out an extended model with occupation choice that can explain this
feature of the data. Women face a decision between staying at home, entering a high-wage, highly
time-consuming occupation or a low-wage, less demanding job. Over time, women perceive a lower
and less uncertain cost of working longer hours and choose careers that pay higher wages. In
the calibrated sector choice model, the predictions for total labor force participation are almost
identical to the benchmark model. The difference is in the wages – they fall and then rise, like the
data.
While learning can offer one explanation for increasing wages, there are obviously other factors
external to the model that have contributed to this trend. One of the robustness exercises in
appendix D feeds data on trending wages in to the model to see what effect they can have on
participation.
The endowment effect is similar. In the data, women working at the beginning of the century
are married to poorer husbands than the women that are in the labor force today. The same is
true in the model: Early on, women perceive of maternal employment as costly and often choose to
work because their husband is poor, making their marginal utility of income high. As the perceived
cost of maternal employment falls, women with richer husbands join the labor force. A similar
effect works to decrease wages. Early on, only very high-ability women work. As they learn that
labor force participation is less detrimental to children, less-able women join the workforce, pushing
wages down.
6 Qualitative Empirical Support
We examine empirical evidence in support of the indirect predictions of the model. The next section
uses these facts in conjunction with our quantitative predictions to distinguish between learning
and other theories of labor force participation.
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6.1 Uncertainty Declined (1972-1996)
If the learning hypothesis is correct, then uncertainty about the effects of labor force participation
on children should decline over time. As beliefs become less uncertain, they are also converging to
the truth. This convergence results in falling cross-sectional dispersion of beliefs. This prediction
of falling cross-sectional dispersion in beliefs receives mixed support in our survey data.
To measure belief dispersion, we use survey data that is not binary. The dispersion of yes-no
answers only reveals how far the average answer is from 50%. Instead, we have three sets of answers
that reflect an intensity of preference: preschool, fechild and fefam. All three begin in 1970 and
end in 2004. We assign a 1 to strongly agree, 2 to agree, 3 to disagree, and 4 to strongly disagree
and take the standard deviation of those replies. In the model, the survey question we pose to
agents is a binary one. Therefore, its answers cannot be directly compared. But we can look at the
changes in dispersion of beliefs (figure 5). Starting in the 1970’s, the dispersion rises slightly and
then falls. If we linearly interpolate between decades to get dispersion numbers for 1977 and 2004,
we find that the predicted belief dispersion falls by 5.5%.
For our benchmark survey measure of beliefs, preschool, dispersion falls by 2.5%, from 0.80 in
1977 to 0.78 in 2004. For fechld, dispersion falls by 9.4%, from 0.96 to 0.87. The exception to this
trend is fefam, for which the dispersion rises from 0.81 to 0.86. However, two features of the fefam
data do point to a decline in uncertainty. If we compare the number of agree or disagree responses
to the number of strongly agree and strongly disagree responses, the fraction of less certain replies
falls from 76% in 1977 to 71% in 2002. Second, the fraction of respondents who reply “I don’t
know” fell from 1.5% in 1977 to 1.2% in 2004. But, this is a small number of replies.
6.2 Elasticity of labor supply
One of the more puzzling changes in female labor force participation in the last 25 years is the
decline in labor supply elasticity. Blau and Kahn (2005) document that the elasticity of labor force
participation to their own wages decreased by 53% between 1980 and 2000.6 A related fact shows
up in our data: In the late 1980’s and throughout the 1990’s, women’s wages continued to increase
6All elasticity estimates come from Blau and Kahn (2005), table 3, model 4.
22
and yet labor force participation stagnated. A decline in wage elasticity is predicted by the model
(proposition 5). But, the magnitude of this decline in the calibrated model is small. Running a
regression similar to Blau and Kahn’s on our simulated model delivers a 1.2% elasticity decline.
Similarly, the estimated elasticity of female labor supply to husbands’ wages became less negative,
falling in magnitude by 47%. The same estimate in the model produces a decline of 2.5%.
One reason for the small change in elasticity has to do with how elasticity is estimated. In
theory, proposition 5 varies one woman’s wage and calculates the change in probability that she
will join the labor force. Empirically, such natural experiments are not observed. Instead, labor
economists regress labor force participation rates on wages to infer elasticities. Any non-wage
heterogeneity that decreases the covariance of wages and participation will reduce this estimate,
even if that added heterogeneity does not make any individual woman less responsive to her wage.
The non-wage sources of heterogeneity in the model are endowments and beliefs. Higher belief
dispersion reduces estimated elasticity.
In the model, belief dispersion rises in the beginning of the sample because agents start with
common priors and then observe different information resulting in different beliefs. This causes
own-wage elasticity to drop by 37% in the first 3 decades. So, the model does produce a large
decline in labor supply elasticity. It just does it too early. This has to do with assuming that
agents have a common prior in 1940, when the model starts.
In the extended model with occupation choice (appendix E), agents learn almost nothing about
the effect of high-intensity careers until the 1970’s. Then, as more women join such careers, more
signals are generated about the effect of high-intensity maternal employment and the dispersion
in beliefs about this new parameter skyrockets in the 70’s and 80’s. In this model, labor supply
elasticity falls by 43% between 1980 and 2000. It captures most of the decline observed in the data.
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6.3 Ancestry affects labor choices
Using data on second generation American women, Ferna´ndez and Fogli (2005) show that cultural
heritage, measured by country of origin, matters for female labor decisions.7 While it could be
that childhood or background affect individual preferences, this evidence is also supportive of an
information-based theory in which differences in cultural heritage or upbringing expose individuals
to different information. By observing different outcomes of previous generations, women from
different cultures form different beliefs about the costs of maternal employment.
Likewise, Ferna´ndez, Fogli, and Olivetti (2002) show that men who are born and raised by
working mothers are more likely to marry a working woman. In our model only women’s infor-
mation affects their labor force participation decision, but it is logical to think that the husband’s
information is also aggregated when the labor force participation decision is jointly made.
7 What Learning Adds to Existing Explanations
While the learning explanation appears to explain the qualitative and quantitative features of the
labor force participation data, there are other logical explanations that could potentially do so as
well. This section compares the predictions of our model with those of alternative explanations
and argues that adding learning can help the existing explanations to better match the data.
7.1 Rising wages for women
Wage-based explanations have a hard time reconciling the evolution of female labor force and wages
in the last 20 years while wages were rising and labor force participation stagnating. For example, ?
use a high wage elasticity to allow changing wages to have a large effect on participation. Although
their elasticity falls over time, it stays high enough to generate a continued increase in participation.
Our theory (proposition 5) gets the change in labor force participation to slow down. This is true
even when we feed in the observed time series of wages for our sample of women. The reason the
model succeeds is because its labor supply elasticity falls lower at the end of the sample.
7Similar results, showing that ancestry affects labor choices can be found in Antecol (2000), Fortin (2005) and
Alesina and Giuliano (2007).
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Also, the wage-based theory misses cross-sectional differences in participation rates documented
in section 1. In particular, it doesn’t explain why women with children responded more than women
without children. Finally, the wage theory predicts no decline in uncertainty about whether women
should participate. If anything, wages have become more uncertain as their dispersion has risen
in recent years (Attanasio and Davis (1996), Krueger and Perri (2006)). Increases in wages are
obviously an important factor in labor force participation. But learning can modify the predictions
of wage-based theories to allow them to match more nuanced features of the data.
7.2 Availability of child care and new technologies
Goods and services to assist working mothers encouraged labor force participation (Greenwood
and Guner 2005). We can model technological change as a change in the true value of nurture
θ. One might argue that as more women entered the labor force, technology reduced the cost
of participation and its negative effects on children, accounting for the survey responses. On the
other hand, new technologies and child care arise when the demand for them is high, in times when
cultural change encourages more women to join the labor force.
One shortcoming of the technology explanation is that it predicts that rich women who can
afford new technologies work first. This is at odds with the data (figure 6). Second, it does not
explain the fall in labor supply elasticity. If the availability of such goods and services is increasing
over time, a second effect should increase the labor supply elasticity: As wages rise, technology and
child care become more affordable. Being able to afford them makes working trade off less with
a nurturing home environment. Inside the model, this is like being able to sacrifice some labor
earnings to reduce θ. That means that not only does an increase in wage increase the benefit to
working, it also reduces its cost. This second effect makes labor supply more sensitive to the wage.
Finally, adding learning explains why women in the same place, at the same time, make different
decisions based on their parents’ ethnicity and labor force decisions.
Both the technology and learning mechanisms could be operating simultaneously. Perhaps
technological innovations and child care became available when there were enough working mothers
demanding them, which reinforced the trend to higher participation. The increased demand could
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come from a change in beliefs about the costs of labor force participation.
7.3 The pill and endogenous fertility
Concurrent with the increase in labor force participation was a decline in fertility. Women started
having fewer children at a later age. Of course, our empirical analysis is all conditional on women
who already have small children. But Goldin and Katz (2002) argue that these women acquired
more human capital by postponing motherhood. Thus, the skill composition of our sample has
changed. This is undoubtedly true. At the same time, it does not explain most of the increase in
labor force participation. That increase started well before the pill was available and continued long
after the pill was widespread. Even conditional on having a child and on educational attainment,
participation still increased over the course of the century. Furthermore, use of the pill itself was
regulated by cultural beliefs about the role women should play in society.
7.4 Preferences changed
The hardest alternative explanation to distinguish is a preference change. Perhaps women prefer
staying at home when lots of other women stay at home, or preferences change adaptively as a
consequence of previous history (Ferna´ndez, Fogli, and Olivetti 2002). Three features of the data
help us argue that learning is going on. They don’t rule out simultaneous changes in preferences,
but they support a role for our theory. First, the questions about beliefs in figure 2 questions are not
about preferences. They are about the effect of work on children. Second, a change in preferences
does not entail a fall in uncertainty. Third, and most importantly, changes in preferences would not
cause the labor supply elasticity to fall over time. It is uncertainty, combined with the concavity of
the utility function, that can generate the decreased sensitivity of participation to wages that we
observe in the data.
Finally, our model can be interpreted as a rational theory of where preference changes come
from. Such a theory is useful because it isolates which preferences matter most for labor force
participation, and it offers a testable, systematic way of thinking about why women’s preferences
have changed.
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8 Conclusion
Female labor force participation is highly correlated with reported beliefs about the toll mothers’
employment takes on their children. Not only is there a similar trend in these two variables, but
they also share a non-linear S-shaped dynamic that other potential explanatory variables do not
exhibit. We document these facts and argue that the S-shaped pattern in beliefs comes from
Bayesian learning. Women learn about the effect of female employment on children by observing
others’ upbringing and outcomes. The feedback effect of learning on labor force participation and
participation on the set of observable outcomes from which agents can learn generates the S-shaped
dynamic. Our learning model delivers indirect testable implications for dispersion in beliefs and
labor supply elasticity that are consistent with the data and distinguish our hypothesis from others.
More broadly, the theory provides some insight about how social changes may arise through
learning from endogenous information. All kinds of cultural norms are adopted because they are
thought to be best practice at the time. If there is no experimentation with alternatives, no new
information is learned and the cultural norms stay fixed. Eventually, a few people with extreme
preferences or abilities deviate from these norms. In doing so, they provide information that others
can observe. This experimentation slowly begins to change beliefs, reducing uncertainty about the
desirability of the alternative practice, which encourages others to engage in it. As more people
deviate from the cultural norm, learning speeds up, social change quickens and a social revolution
takes hold.
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A Technical Appendix: Proofs
A.1 Proof of proposition 1
Step 1: Define a cutoff wage w¯ such that all women who observe wi,t > w¯ choose to join the labor force.
A woman joins the labor force when EUWit − EUOit > 0. Note that ∂Ni,t/∂wit = (nitwit + ωit)−γ > 0. Since
Ni,t is monotonically increasing in the wage w, there is a unique w¯ for each set of parameters, such that at w = w¯,
Ni,t = 0.
Step 2: Describe the probability of labor force participation.
Let Φ denote the cumulative density function for the unconditional distribution of wages in the population. This
is a log-normal c.d.f. Since the lognormal is unbounded and has positive probability on every outcomes, its c.d.f. is
therefore strictly increasing in its argument. Then, the probability that a woman participates is 1 − Φ(w¯), which is
then strictly decreasing in w¯.
Step 3: The effect of beliefs on labor force participation
Taking the partial derivative of the net utility gain from labor force participation yields ∂Ni,t/∂µi,t = −β. By
the implicit function theorem, ∂w¯/∂µi,t > 0. Thus, ∂(1 − Φ(w¯))/∂µi,t = (∂(1 − Φ(w¯))/∂w¯)(∂w¯/∂µi,t) < 0, which
completes the proof.
A.2 Proof of proposition 2
Steps 1 and 2 of the proof are as in appendix A.1.
The benefit to participating is falling in uncertainty: ∂Ni,t/∂σi,t = (1−γ)β exp
 
(µa − µi,t)(1− γ) + 12 (σ2a + σ2i,t)(1− γ)2

.
Since γ > 1, β > 0 by assumption, and the exponential term must be non-negative, this means that ∂Ni,t/∂σ2i,t <
0. As before, the implicit function theorem tells us that ∂w¯/∂σ2i,t > 0. Thus, ∂(1 − Φ(w¯))/∂σ2i,t = (∂(1 −
Φ(w¯))/∂w¯)(∂w¯/∂σ2i,t) < 0, which completes the proof.
A.3 Proof of proposition 3: Zero participation is not a steady state
Proof: For any arbitrary beliefs µjt, σjt and endowment ωjt, there is some finite level of ability a∗ and an associated
wage w∗ = exp(a∗), such that EUWit > EUOit > 0, ∀ajt ≥ a∗. The fact that ajt is normally distributed means that
Prob(ajt ≥ a∗) > 0 for all finite a∗. Since woman j enters the labor force whenever EUWit > EUOit > 0, and this
happens with positive probability, njt = 1 with positive probability. Since this is true for all women j, it is also true
that
P
j njt ≥ 1 with positive probability.
A.4 Proof of proposition 4
Steps 1 and 2 of the proof are as in appendix A.1.
The benefit to participating is falling in wealth: ∂Ni,t/∂ωi,t = (wi,t+ωi,t)−γ− (ωi,t)−γ . This is negative because
(wi,t + ωi,t) > (ωi,t) holds as long as wi,t > 0. Since wi,t has a log-normal distribution, it is greater than zero with
probability one. As before, the implicit function theorem tells us that ∂w¯/∂ωi,t > 0. Thus, ∂(1 − Φ(w¯))/∂ωi,t =
(∂(1− Φ(w¯))/∂w¯)(∂w¯/∂ωi,t) < 0, which completes the proof.
A.5 Proof of proposition 5
There are two effects of increasing the average wage that show up in elasticity: (1) the direct effect on increasing
the number of women whose wages are above the cutoff that determines whether they join the labor force or not;
(2) the increase in the expected future wages of children affects the expected cost of joining the labor force. We
examine how an increase in uncertainty σ affects each part separately, for a woman (i, t). We call the elasticity of this
woman’s labor supply the conditional elasticity, because it is conditional on her endowment ωit and beliefs µit, σit.
The last step shows that if σ increases the conditional elasticity for every woman, it increases the aggregate labor
supply elasticity as well.
Step 1: Direct own-wage effect. The probability that a woman participates is 1 − Φ(w¯it), which is then
strictly decreasing in w¯it, as defined in appendix A.1. Rewrite the cumulative density function as the standard normal
c.d.f. Φ˜ of the log of w¯it, adjusted by the mean and standard deviation of log wages, µw and σw. The probability of
labor force participation, conditional on having endowment ωi and beliefs µit, σit is then 1− Φ˜(ln(w¯it)−µw/σw). The
marginal effect of increasing one’s own log wage is the standard normal probability density φ˜(ln(w¯it)− µw/σw) > 0.
The conditional elasticity of labor force participation is ∂ ln(1 − Φ˜(·))/∂µw, since µw is the log average wage. The
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conditional elasticity for woman (i, t) to a change in the mean of her own wage is therefore φ˜(ln(w¯it)− µw/σw)/(1−
Φ˜(·)), which is a standard normal hazard function, H(ln(w¯it)− µw/σw).
Next, how does the decreasing uncertainty about the effect of nurture change this own-wage elasticity for woman
(i, t) over time? Uncertainty affects (1 − Φ˜(ln(w¯it) − µw/σw)) through its effect on the cutoff wage w¯it. The proof
of proposition A.2 tells us that ∂w¯it/∂σi,t > 0. Therefore, the effect of an increase in uncertainty is given by the
cross-partial derivative ∂2 ln(1 − Φ˜(·))/∂µw∂w¯it > 0. This is positive because a standard normal hazard function is
always increasing in its argument.
Step 2: Indirect effect on children’s wages. This effect is the increase in the expected value of (µa −
ni,tµi,t) = µw in the second term of (6). This indirect effect works through the effect of µw on ln(w¯it). Putting the
two effects together gives us the total conditional elasticity of labor force participation to a change in average wage.
Let CEit represent this conditional elasticity.
CEit = H

ln(w¯it)− µw
σw

+
∂ ln(1− Φ˜(·))
∂ ln(w¯it)
∂ ln(w¯it)
∂µw
= H

ln(w¯it)− µw
σw

(1− ∂ ln(w¯it)
∂µw
)
Lastly, we need to compute the derivative of the conditional elasticity with respect to uncertainty σ2i,t.
∂CEit
∂σ2i,t
= H

ln(w¯it)− µw
σw

(
∂ ln(w¯it)
∂σ2i,t
)(1− ∂ ln(w¯it)
∂µw
)−H

ln(w¯it)− µw
σw

∂2 ln(w¯it)
∂µw∂σ2i,t
.
Step 1 established that the first term is positive. Since hazard functions are always positive, the last remaining step
is to show that ∂2 ln(w¯it)/∂µw∂σ
2
i,t < 0.
Step 3: Show that ∂2 ln(w¯it)/∂µw∂σ
2
i,t < 0. Note that
∂Ni,t/∂µw = β exp

µa(1− γ) + 1
2
σ2a(1− γ)2

exp

(γ − 1)ni,tµi,t + 1
2
n2i,tσ
2
i,t(1− γ)2

− 1

.
This is positive because (γ − 1)ni,tµi,t + 12n2i,tσ2i,t(1 − γ)2 > 0. This tells us that when expected wages are higher,
Ni,t, the net benefit of working is higher. This arises because the marginal utility cost of a reduction in expected
wages for children is lower if the expected level of those wages is higher. Differentiating this expression again with
respect to uncertainty yields:
∂2Ni,t
∂µw∂σ2i,t
= β exp

µa(1− γ) + 1
2
σ2a(1− γ)2

exp

(γ − 1)ni,tµi,t + 1
2
n2i,tσ
2
i,t(1− γ)2

1
2
n2i,t(1− γ)2 > 0.
Note also that ∂2Ni,t/∂µw∂w = 0 and ∂2Ni,t/∂σ2i,t∂w = 0. Therefore, applying the implicit function rule and
differentiating a second time tells us that
∂2 ln(w¯it)
∂µw∂σ2i,t
= −∂
2Ni,t/∂µw∂σ2i,t
∂Ni,t/∂w + 0.
Since the numerator is positive and the denominator is positive, the negative sign in front makes the cross-partial
negative.
Step 4: Convert conditional to aggregate elasticity. If the conditional elasticity for every woman (i, t)
increases when their σit increases, then when every σit rises, the aggregate wage elasticity of labor rises as well. The
unconditional elasticity is
R
CEitdF (ωit, µit, σit). Since we can reverse the order of differentiation and integration,
the result that the partial derivative of this term is
R
∂CEit/∂ ln(w¯it)dF (ωit, µit, σit). Since the term inside the
integrand is positive for every (ωit, µit, σit), the whole expression is positive.
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B Data Description
B.1 Survey data about beliefs
Data come from http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/GSS/ .
Attitudes We have 6 measures for individuals’ attitudes toward women working that have a time series dimension.
fehome Women should take care of running their homes and leave running the country up to men. (AGREE=1,
DISAGREE=2, NOT SURE=8, NO ANSWER=9, NA=0). We generate a dummy variable fehome=1 if
FEHOME=1 and =0 if FEHOME=2. exclude observations for which FEHOME= 0 or FEHOME> 2.
The data span 1974-1998, with nine missing years. There are between 890 and 1884 responses per year, with
16 years of observations, for a total 22,538 data points. The fraction of respondents who agree ranges from
38% in 1977 to 14% in 1995.
fework Do you approve or disapprove of a married woman earning money in business or industry if she has a
husband capable of supporting her? (AGREE=1, DISAGREE=2, NOT SURE=8, NO ANSWER=9, NA=0).
We generate dummy variable fework same as for fehome.
The data span 1972-1998, with ten missing years, for a total of 17 years with observations. There are between
902 and 1,933 responses per year, and 24,401 total observations. The fraction of respondents who agree ranges
from 48% in 1972 to 37% in 1996.
fechld A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who
does not work. (STRONGLY AGREE=1, AGREE=2, DISAGREE=3, STRONGLY DISAGREE=4, DON’T
KNOW=8, NO ANSWER=9, NA=0). We use this variable as is, except observations with FECHLD= 0 and
FECHLD> 4 which we treat as missing.
There is one set of observations in 1977, and then from 1995-2004, at least every two years, for a total of
14 years in which data are available. There are between 897 and 1,948 responses per year, totalling 19,270
observations. The average reply ranges from 2.5 in 1977 to 2.1 in 1994.
preschool A preschool child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works. (STRONGLY AGREE=1, AGREE=2,
DISAGREE=3, STRONGLY DISAGREE=4, DON’T KNOW=8, NO ANSWER=9, NA=0). The only mod-
ification we make to this variable is to treat observations with preschool= 0 and preschool> 4 as missing.
There is one set of observations in 1977, and then from 1995-2004, at least every two years, for a total of
14 years in which data are available. There are between 890 and 2,344 responses per year, totalling 19,005
observations. The average reply ranges from 2.2 in 1977 to 2.6 in 2004.
fefam It is much better for everyone involved if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care
of the home and family. (STRONGLY AGREE=1, AGREE=2, DISAGREE=3, STRONGLY DISAGREE=4,
DON’T KNOW=8, NO ANSWER=9, NA=0). The only modification we make to this variable is to treat
observations with FEFAM= 0 and FEFAM> 4 as missing.
There is one set of observations in 1977, and then from 1995-2004, at least every two years, for a total of
14 years in which data are available. There are between 894 and 2,353 responses per year, totalling 19,024
observations. The average reply ranges from 2.2 in 1977 to 2.6 in 2004.
Acceptance We have 3 measures of acceptance of women working over life cycle. We do not have much of times
series dimension (only start in 1988), but they are interesting to show how the presence of a small child is crucial in
determining individuals’ attitudes.
Attitudes toward women working over life cycle: 3 stages of life cycle corresponding to 3 variables. We have these
3 variables for only 3 years (1988, 1994, 2002). Not much variation over 14 years, but can be used to make cross-
section point. First 9 tables show each variable in each year. Last 3 show the three variables when all observations
are pooled across years.
wrknokid Should a woman work outside the home after marrying and before there are children? (1=FULL,
2=PART, 3=STAYHOME, 8=CAN’T CHOOSE, 9=NOANSWER, 0=NA). Generate variable wrknokid=WRKNOKID
but recode WRKNOKID=0 and WRKNOKID=9 as missing.
wrkbaby Should a woman work outside the home when there is a child under school age? (1=FULL, 2=PART,
3=STAY HOME, 8=CAN’T CHOOSE, 9=NO ANSWER, 0=NA). Generate variable wrkbaby=WRKBABY
but recode WRKBABY=0 and WRKBABY=9 as missing.
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wrksch Should a woman work outside the home after the youngest child starts school? (1=FULL, 2=PART,
3=STAY HOME, 8=CAN’T CHOOSE, 9=NO ANSWER, 0=NA). Generate variable wrksch=WRKSCH but
recode WRKSCH=0 and WRKSCH=9 as missing.
Pre-1972 Data The attitudes data from GSS begin only in 1972. However, the increasing speed of female entry
in the labor force (start of the S) precedes that date. To establish the contemporaneous S-shaped evolution of beliefs,
it is vital to have more historical data.
We have one measure of beliefs that is collected infrequently, since the 1930’s. That is FEWORK. This data are
from IPOLL databank, maintained by the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research. Unfortunately, the phrasing
of the questions differs slightly over time. We describe below the questions and the replies.
August 1936 The Gallup Poll asked: “Should a married woman earn money if she has a husband capable of
supporting her?” 18% said yes, 82% no. No uncertain or no response entries were allowed.
October 1938 The Gallup Poll asked: “Do you approve of a married woman earning money in business or industry
if she has a husband capable of supporting her?” 22% approve, 78% disapprove.
November 1945 The Gallup Poll (AIPO) asked: “Do you approve or disapprove of a married woman holding a
job in business and industry if her husband is able to support her?” 62% disapprove, 18% approve. The rest
of the replies are miscellaneous open answers (e.g., if she has a good job, if she has no children, etc.).
June 1970 The Gallup Poll asked: “Do you approve of a married woman earning money in business or industry if
she has a husband capable of supporting her?” 60% approve, 36% disapprove, 4% do not know.
Inferring pre-1977 preschool answers Figure 4 plots survey responses that are preschool replies from
1977-2004. Before 1967, the only beliefs series we have is fework. There are 3 observations available before 1967 and
then regular observations starting in 1970. For each of the pre-1977 observations, we compute the growth rate from
one data point to the next. Then, we apply these same growth rates to project our preschool data back from 1977 to
the earlier observations. We believe that using one series to infer another is a reasonably accurate procedure because
for years in which both survey questions are asked, the correlation in the replies is 74%.
B.2 Labor force participation and wage data
The wages data come from IPUMS (Integrated Public Use Microdata Series). It covers 1920-2005. It is every 10
years until 2000, and yearly thereafter. The data are a 1-in-100 national random sample of the population until 2000.
After 2000, it is the American Community Survey 2001 sample: a 1-in-232 (approximately) national random sample
of the population. We used only data on white women who are not agricultural workers and live with family members
in their household: (race=1, gq=1, farm=1, sex=2, excluding occ=810, 820, 830, 840, 123, 100). Residents of Hawaii
(statefip=15) and Alaska (statefip=2) are excluded.
Labor Force Observations are dropped if the occupation is in agriculture or the respondent lives on a farm or in
an institution. Ages range from 25-54. They are white, married women with spouse present and at least one
child under age 5 living in the household. Data are weighted using perwt (sample weights from census). There
are no missing labor force observations.
Wages Data start in 1940. (Inctot and incwage start in 1940.) We deflated wages using the consumer price index
(Series Id: CUUR0000SA0). The base year is 1982 − 84 = 100. Note that since the survey always asks about
the previous year’s wages, the 1940 wage data are really about 1939 wages.
We make three modifications to these data. First, we recode the labor force variable and the empstat (em-
ployment status) variable as missing value if labforce=0 or empstat=0, meaning that the answer was N/A.
Second, to account for the top-coding of the income variable, we multiply the top-coded values of INCWAGE
(wage income) by a factor of 1.4. Finally, we take the log of each woman’s wage, then average across women.
Correcting sample bias There are two issues of sample bias. The first is the standard issue that the census is
not perfectly representative. The standard solution to this problem is to use the weights that the census
provides on the frequency of various characteristics in the population. We weight all moments by the census-
provided variable perwt. The second issue arises only for 1950 data. The weeks worked and income variables
are called ”sample line” items in 1950 which means that they were collected only for 1 in 330 respondents.
Therefore, we use a different weight ”slwt” in 1950. When we look at husband’s characteristics in 1950, we
weight the husband’s income using the women’s weight perwt, so that the moments of husbands’ wages are
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the endowments of “representative” women. This is equivalent to restricting the sample to only sample line
individuals since they are a flat sample in the population.
Dropped observations Also, since working FTYR this year is no guarantee of having worked the year before,and
since the earnings refer to the previous year, we also condition on having positive earnings in the previous year
for both men and women.
Other data issues We take care of inflation by using CPI (Series Id: CUUR0000SA0), base year 1982-84=100. We
recode weeks and hours worked by assigning midpoints We generate a dummy FTYR =1 if (weekworkrec>= 50
and hourworkrec>= 40) We need to condition for women to work full time year around because otherwise we
find an incredibly large difference between men and women annual earnings due to the large difference in their
labor supply.
Hours and weeks worked The weeks worked variable (WKSWORK2) is an indicator variable that describes which
interval the respondent’s answer fell in. We replace each indicator with the middle point of the reported interval.
We do the same for hours worked (hrswork2). The reporting procedure changes in 1980. From 1980 on, we
used the reported average hours per week (UHRSWORK).
Full time This is a dummy variable that indicates if two conditions are satisfied: 1) hrswork2 recoded ≥ 40, meaning
that the worker worked at least 40 hours per week; and 2) WKSWORK2 recoded ≥ 50, meaning that the
woman reports being employed for at least 50 weeks.
C Calibration Details
Throughout, we look at women 25-54, with their own child younger than 5 living in the household. We use individuals
not living in institution, not living in farm, not working in agriculture and white.
Abilities The distribution of women’s abilities is constructed so that their wages in the model match the distribution
of women’s wages in the 1940 census data. σa = .55 is the standard deviation of log ability and µa =
ln(earnings gap)− (σ2a)/2 is the mean of log ability. These parameters match the initial ratio between average
earnings of working women to average earnings of all husbands (0.4 in the data) and to match the standard
deviation of log earnings of women in the data (1.08 in the data).
Selection effects in the model The distribution of observed wages in the data needs to be matched with the
distribution of wages for employed women in the model. Employed women are not a representative sample.
They are disproportionately high-skill women. The calibration deals with this issue by matching the unrepre-
sentative sample in the data to the same unrepresentative sample in the model. In other words, we use the
model to back out how much selection bias there is.
Endowment distribution Data come from the census. We use wages in 1940 (first available year). From this, we
construct two pools of matched data: One is only married women; the other is their husbands.
The log endowment is normal. For these two sets of wage data, we take the log of wages over previous year.
For husbands, mean(log incwage husb ) = 7.043089 and std(log incwage husb) = .7348059. Therefore, we set
σω = 0.73. We choose the mean log endowment µω = −(σ2ω)/2 such that mean endowment is normalized to 1.
Initial labor force participation We need a period 0 participation rate that determines the period 1 wage distri-
bution of women and a period 1 participation rate to start the simulation. Period zero FLFP=3%, period one
FLFP=6%. These are given from Census 1930 and 1940 for women, married, white, not living in farms, not
living in institutions, age 25-45 with a child younger than 5 living in the household.
True value of nurture To calibrate the θ parameter, we use micro evidence on the effect of maternal employment
on the future earnings of children. Our evidence on the effect of maternal employment comes from the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), in particular the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT) at age 4
and the Peabody Individual Achievement Test (PIAT) for math and reading recognition scores measured at
age 5 and 6. One year of full time maternal employment plus informal day care reduces test scores by roughly
3.4% (Bernal and Keane 2006). If a mother works from one year after birth until age six, these five years of
employment translate in to a score reduction of 17%.
The childhood test scores are significantly correlated with educational attainment at 18. A 1% increase in the
math at age 6 is associated with .019 years of additional schooling. A 1% increase in the reading test score at
age 6 is associated with .025 additional school years. Therefore, five years of maternal employment translates
into between 0.32 (17*.019) and 0.42 (17*.025) fewer years of school.
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Figure 7: Sensitivity of labor force predictions to changes in parameter values.
The final step is to multiply the change in educational attainment by the returns to a college education. We
use the returns to a year of college from 1940 to 1995 from Goldin and Katz (1999). Their estimates are the
composition-adjusted log weekly wage for full-time/full-year, non agricultural, white males. Those estimates
are 0.1, 0.077, 0.091, 0.099, 0.089, 0.124, and 0.129 for the years 1939, 1949, 1959, 1969, 1979, 1989, and 1995.
The average return to a year of college is 10%. Since maternal employment reduces education by 0.32-0.42
years, the expected loss in terms of foregone yearly log earnings is about 4%, or θ = 0.04.
Number of signals J is calibrated to the probability that a mother and daughter make the same participation
choice. This probability comes from GSS data on married women with children under six who report that
they work either full-time or are homemakers and who reported whether their mother worked for at least one
year after having children and before they were six years of age.
D Robustness Checks
We explore the sensitivity of model outcomes to changes in four key sets of calibrated parameters.
Number of signals Since the number of signals is not something we can directly observe, it is important that our
results not be too sensitive to it. Increasing the number of signals to 4 or decreasing it to 2 either speeds up or
slows down learning. This can be seen in the steeper or flatter S-shapes in panel (a). Table 2 shows that the
number of signals has mild effects on initial endowments and wages. These initial effects arise because more
signals make agents beliefs initially more different. Differences in beliefs, rather than differences in endowments
or abilities then becomes a more important determinant of the participation decision. Since selection effects
drive the average wage and endowment of working women, the number of signals affects this. The effect is
mild. The number of signals has no effect on the ending endowment of wage.
Initial mean and variance One particularly controversial assumption is that initial beliefs are unbiased (µ0 = θ).
This is dubious in part because our survey evidence suggests otherwise. The fact the respondents report less
harm to children from maternal employment later in the sample suggests that average beliefs about θ started
out higher and then fell.
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Model parameter starting ending starting ending
value wage wage endowment endowment
Few signals J = 2 0.58 0.52 0.61 0.80
More signals J = 4 0.55 0.51 0.70 0.80
Biased beliefs µ0 = .2, σ0 = 1.2 0.57 0.51 0.63 0.80
Biased beliefs µ0 = .5, σ0 = .8 0.58 0.52 0.49 0.77
High ability µa = 0.73 0.83 0.75 0.52 0.82
Low ability µa = 0.24 0.28 0.26 0.90 0.86
Calibrated wage µa changes 0.56 0.59 0.68 0.80
High nurture θ = 0.06 0.56 0.51 0.67 0.79
Low nurture θ = 0.02 0.56 0.52 0.68 0.82
Benchmark 0.56 0.51 0.67 0.80
Table 2: Sensitivity of wage and endowment predictions to parameter changes.
We explore different µ0 and σ0 pairs such that 1940 labor force participation still matches its empirical value.
That restricts the set of initial mean beliefs considerably. The upper bound is given by the µ0 that delivers
6.7% initial participation with no uncertainty (σ0 = 0). That upper bound is µ0 = 0.64. Given that we want
to explore a situation were agents over-estimate the cost of maternal employment, this restricts µ0 to values
greater than 0.04. To explore settings where changes in the mean of beliefs, rather than their variance drive
most of the change in participation, we start agents out with beliefs µ0 = 0.2, σ0 = 1.2, and with a more
extreme bias, µ0 = 0.5, σ0 = 0.8. The moderate bias in beliefs has so little effect on labor force participation
that the µ0 = 0.2 line in panel b completely obscures the line plotted underneath it for the benchmark model.
Starting agents out with a high degree of certainty that their initial beliefs are right does have an effect. It
makes them slower to learn. But, even when we make initial beliefs about θ and order of magnitude larger
than the truth, the effects on the labor force participation, wages and endowments is not dramatic.
Mean of ability / wages We do three exercises to explore the role of the ability distribution. The first two are
straightforward: move the mean of the ability distribution (exp(µa)) 50% up and down. The results are labeled
high ability and low ability.
When women have higher ability, on average, they are more likely to join the labor force and earn higher
wages when they work. The effect on participation rates is large, telling us that our results are sensitive to our
ability distribution. However, it is comforting that wages are even more sensitive to the mean of ability. This
tells us that a given wage distribution provides precise information about what the right ability distribution
is.
Time-varying ability distribution The third ability-distribution exercise explores what role empirical changes in
wages plays in determining participation. This is the same benchmark model, but a change in the calibration
strategy. Instead of assuming that the distributions of endowments and abilities of women are changing over-
time, we calibrate a distribution of endowments and of abilities for each decade. The endowment distribution
mean and variance comes from the census data in each decade on married men’s wages. The distribution of
female abilities is calibrated so that wages for working women in the model have the same mean and standard
deviation as in the data, for each decade.
Labor force participation is roughly the same with or without exogenous wage increases in 1940 and in 2010.
The main difference is that women with exogenous wage changes start participating more slowly because their
husbands’ wages are increasing rapidly in the 50’s, 60’s and 70’s. Then, labor force participation takes off in
the 1970’s and 80’s. This more steeply-sloped s-shape is more consistent with the data.
True value of nurture We explore two alternative true values of nurture - one that is 50% higher and one that is
50% lower than out initial estimate. These changes have small effects of the ending labor force participation
rate. They have no effect on wages or endowments.
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E Extension: A Model with Occupation Choice
The prediction that women’s wages should decrease over time is squarely at odds with the data. In this section, we
argue that this is not a problem with a learning explanation; it is a problem with assuming women have only one
career choice. Allowing women the option to participate in a highly time-intensive but high-wage career, to have
a normal career, or to nurture children, results in more women choosing the high-wage career over time. As the
composition of career choices changes, wages rise.
The timing, the number of agents and preferences are the same as in the standard model. What is differs is that
a woman has an additional career option. If she chooses a high-intensity career, she gets a known multiple w˜ > 1 of
her baseline wage, but may further compromise her ability to nurture her child. Agents learn about two unknown
parameters: the value of nurture θ and the toll on a child of high-intensity maternal employment θ˜.
The budget constraint of the individual from family i born at time t− 1 is
cit = (nit + hitw˜)wit + ωit (11)
where hit ∈ {0, 1} indicates the choice of a high-intensity career; ωit is an endowment which could represent a spouse’s
income, and nit ∈ {0, 1} is the choice to join a low-intensity career. If the agent works in the labor force, nit = 1. If
she works in a high intensity career, hit = 1. A woman can only have one career: nit + hit ≤ 1.
As before, endowed ability is ai,t ∼ N(µa, σ2a). If a mother stays home with her child, the child’s full natural
ability is achieved. If the mother chooses a low-intensity career, some unknown amount θ of the child’s ability will
be lost; for a high-intensity career, the loss is θ˜ > θ. Wages depend exponentially on ability:
wi,t = exp(ai,t − ni,t−1θ − hi,t−1θ˜) (12)
Information Sets The constants θ and θ˜ are not known when making labor supply decisions. In the first
generation, initial beliefs are θ ∼ N(µ0, σ20) and θ˜ ∼ N(µ˜0, σ˜20). The errors in beliefs (µ0 − θ) and (µ˜ − θ˜) are
independent. We assume that the high-intensity career is initially thought to be more detrimental to children:
µ˜0 > µ0.
Each generation updates these beliefs by observing wages and nurturing decisions for themselves and for the
same set Ji of peers as in the original model. Ability a is never observed so that neither θ, nor θ˜ can ever be perfectly
inferred from the wage. An important feature of (12) is that a wage is only informative about θ˜ if the worker’s mother
had an intense career.
Bayesian updating with J signals is equivalent to running the following regression of children’s potential wages
on mothers’ labor choices
Wit − µa = Nitθ +Hitθ˜ + εit
where Wit, Nit and Hit are J × 1 vectors {logwj,t}j²Ji , {ni,t−1}j²Ji and {hi,t−1}j²Ji . Then, agents form a linear
combination of the OLS-estimated θˆ or θ˜ and the prior beliefs µt, µ˜t. Let h¯i,t be the sum of the high-intensity careers
chosen by the set of families that (i, t) observes: h¯i,t =
P
j²Ji hi,t. The resulting estimate of θ˜ is normally distributed
with mean µ˜i,t =
P
j²Ji(logwj,t − µa)hj,t/h¯i,t and variance σ˜
2 = σ2a/h¯i,t.
Equilibrium
1. Beliefs θ ∼ N(µi,t, σ2i,t) and θ˜ ∼ N(µ˜i,t, σ˜2i,t) are formed according to the rules in (4) and (5). Because
the unknown components of θ and θ˜ are independent, updating occurs separately for high-intensity and low-
intensity careers.
2. Substituting (11) and (12) into expected utility produces the following optimization problem. Choose nit, hit ² {0, 1} :
nit + hit ≤ 1 to maximize:
((nit + hitw˜it)wit + ωit)
1−γ
1− γ +
β
1− γEit
h
exp

(ai,t+1 − nitθ − hitθ˜)(1− γ)
i
+ L(1− nit − hit). (13)
3. Distributions of observed wage outcomes indexed by Ji,t are consistent with distribution of optimal labor
choices ni,(t−1) and hi,(t−1).
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Figure 8: Participation and wages in the two sector model.
Solving for occupation choice For each possible career choice, we compute the expectation of (13), con-
ditional on time t information (µit, σit, µ˜it, σ˜it). The expected value of staying out of the labor force, EUO and of
working in a low-intensity career EUW are given by (7) and (8). The expected utility of a high-intensity career is
EUHit =
(witw˜ + ωit)
1−γ
1− γ +
β
1− γ exp

(µa − µ˜i,t)(1− γ) + 1
2
(σ2a + σ˜
2
i,t)(1− γ)2

. (14)
The optimal career choice for woman i in generation t is: (i) if EUOit > EUWit and EUOit > EUHit, then
stay home; (ii) if EUWit > EUOit and EUWit > EUHit, then work in a low-intensity career; (iii) otherwise, if
EUHit > EUOit and EUHit > EUWit, then work in a high-intensity career.
Calibration The new model introduces four additional parameters: the true cost θ˜, the initial beliefs µ˜0 and
σ˜0, and the wage premium w˜. For the true nurture cost of high-intensity careers, we calibrate the ratio θ˜/θ to the
ratio of hours worked by women in high-intensity to low-intensity professions. Duxbury and Higgins (2003) report
that along many dimensions, professional careers are about twice as straining on households. First, the likelihood of
having to do overnight job-related travel increases. 19% of non-professional and 40% of professional women report
spending one night a month away from home. 30% of non-professional and 60% of professional women bring work
home. Finally, non-professional women do about 11.4 hours of unpaid overtime work per month, while professional
women work about 17.7 unpaid hours.
As before, beliefs are unbiased, so that µ˜0 = θ. We leave the initial uncertainty unchanged: σ˜0 = σ0. The wage
premium is the college wage premium for women (Goldin and Katz 2002).
Simulation results In figure 8, labor force participation looks almost identical to the benchmark model. It
composition, not its level is changing. The high-intensity participation rises more gradually in the model than in the
data, but matches its start and end points well. That data is the number of first year female students in professional
schools, divided by the number of first year female college students, reported by Goldin and Katz (2002).
Women’s wages, which fell in the benchmark model now fall and then rise. The rise for relative wages is very
slight. This happens because the model over-predicts the increase in the husbands’ wages. So, the relative wife to
husband’s wage is suppressed. What will help remedy this problem is to have the wage premium rise. In future work,
we plan to calibrate the model so that the wages high-intensity careers refer to professions that require an advanced
degree: lawyers, doctors, MBA’s, ect. The higher wage premia in these professions could help to match the increase
in relative wages.
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